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Abstract
Political economy debates about the influence of power configurations in expanding
and maintaining global liberalization ebb and flow with the wax and wane of the
concentration of power in the international system. The manuscript engages the debate
in a novel way from previous scholarship. Employing a series of econometric models
that account for regional power, I argue that the global power concentration is ill
fit to be the primary predictor of trade liberalization, but instead, regional power
fluctuations can dampen and enhance global trends. By incorporating sub-systemic
power configurations, we gain a better understanding of the regional variation in states
buying into or cashing out of interdependence.
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1 Introduction
Research on the link between power dominance and trade liberalization appears to ebb and
flow with the flow and ebb of global power concentration. While we observe liberalization
during the 19th century under British hegemony and during the latter half of the 20th cen-
tury as American power increased (Kindleberger 1973), scholars questioned the viability of
sustained liberalization as American power seemed to evaporate in the 1970s. This series of
debates thinned by the 1990s as the American moment manifested and rapid changes in in-
ternational institutions, political regimes, and economic policy produced rapid globalization
that seemed unthinkable in the previous two decades. While there have been some research
programs that continue to evaluate how the various types of hierarchy affect global patterns
of trade (e.g. Lake 2009), there is much about this relationship that remains unexplored.
This study explores how research has ignored the effect of countervailing forces at a lower
level of analysis: the region. I argue that, while there are global trends in trade that corre-
late with the rise and decline of global power concentration, regional power configurations
enhance and diminish those effects. When there is relative power parity regionally, then the
effects of systemic pressures for liberalization are prominent as there does not exist a strong
regional force to counteract a global power. However, if a regional power is dominant over
its peers, then it is freer to act against globalizing trends due to the absence of a significant
rival. Consequently, while asymmetric global systems seem to produce periods of liberal-
ization, regions of asymmetry work to act against those trends; the most conducive power
configurations for trade liberalization requires an asymmetric global power with regions of
middle powers that rest at parity.
To ascertain evidence for this relationship between regional and global power configura-
tions on trade, I analyze three different units: directed dyad-years, undirected dyad-years,
and country-years. Examining both import activity as well as total trade, I find that two dis-
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tinct measurements of regional power disparity correlate with decreased trade activity while
parity encourages trade activity. States in neighborhoods dominated by a single regional
power tend to have weaker trade activity than states in multipolar neighborhoods.
2 Power and Interdependence
The treatment of power and hierarchy in this research follows previous scholarship in con-
ceptualizing power as both the ability to use various assets to influence actors to behave
differently than they otherwise would have as well as the ability to achieve desired outcomes
despite resistance (Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1983). This ability, whether latent or manifest, gives
states the capability to influence the rules and institutions that constrain and enable other
actors’ behavior. Waltz argues that the rank of states comes down to “size of population and
territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and
competence.” (1979, 131) The effectiveness of power can change based on the configuration
of the international system or with the emergence and obsolescence of the technologies that
drive the reach and applicability of exercising power (e.g. military technology, communica-
tion speed, transportation costs). For some theories, this project included, the arrangement
of states and their relative power can both condition the environment that they interact in
as well as change their own effectiveness in international affairs.
Scholarship on international hierarchy, power, and trade is a fundamental component
of international relations scholarship and transcends political science and political econ-
omy as scholars in related fields such as history (Gallagher and Robinson 1953), economics
(Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1987), and sociology (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000;
Wallerstein 2000) research these relationships. While early, dominant strains of realism dis-
missed the intersection between politics and economics as merely “low politics” (e.g. Waltz
1979), other scholars, notably Hirschman (1945), pursued the bidirectional influence of na-
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tional power and foreign trade (Barbieri 1996).
The research program of hegemonic stability theory establishes a wealth of research be-
tween structural and national power with liberalization and conflict in the 1970s. With the
decline of US power seemingly evidenced by the US failure to achieve its objectives in Viet-
nam, petroleum exporters establishing an oil embargo, and the collapse of the Bretton-Woods
system, it was apparent that the force that kept global financial and economic institutions
afloat was unlikely to persist. Kindleberger (1973) saw the present crisis and the early 1930s
as linked to the failure of those capable of exerting leadership being unwilling to do so.
Specifically, the United States had the potential to prevent economic retrenchment and, due
to domestic pressures, did not don the mantle of global leadership. Krasner (1976) offered a
structural version of hierarchy and found evidence for a causal relationship between periods
of global hegemony and global trade activity; scholars replicated this result with varying def-
initions of hegemony, hierarchy, and structural power concentration (Mansfield 1993; Lake
2009).
The distinction between leadership and structural theories of power and trade led to an
explosion of literature over the next decade. In the structural study of global power con-
centration, part of the debate concerned establishing the conditions for when a power would
pursue liberalization. A persistent issue in international trade are states that erect barriers
to imports to preserve some domestic industry (Midford 1993). Tariffs are domestically in-
efficient and hurt both domestic consumers, domestic producers, as well as trading partners
(Tullock 1967; Frankel, Romer et al. 1999). Early research posited that global liberalization
was a public good that creates a basic collective action problem; only when a single powerful
state emerges that there is an actor with enough incentive to overpay for the good and solve
the problem (Krasner 1976; Gowa 1989). The issue of whether liberalized international trade
was actually a public good or an excludable private good persisted (Conybeare 1984; Snidal
1985), but ultimately does not matter for advancing our understanding here.
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A dominant state that excels in financial, economic, and military power has a distinct
interest in establishing an economically interdependent world by encouraging states to reduce
barriers to trade. In the short term, a dominant power will benefit from encouraging other
states to drop their protectionist policies and open their markets to global trade. Given that
the dominant state is an economic power, the state has a distinct interest in having access to
raw materials, finished goods, and markets in which to sell its products. In the long term, as
states become more dependent upon the established economic and political order, they will
have less incentive to seek to change or overthrow the status quo (Organski 1958; Organski
and Kugler 1980). The primacy of a state affords it the ability to use its position, hard power,
and soft power as tools to bring recalcitrant states to a similar perspective as its own. This
alignment of interests between a dominant power and an emerging power may explain why
the United States and Great Britain do not go to war despite the US emergence as a major
power by the end of the 1890s that quickly surmounts Britain in latent power. The United
States is resistant to two major economic policies Great Britain promotes in the latter-half
of the 19th century, trade liberalization and adoption of the gold standard, but becomes a
champion for both policies as it becomes a global power at the end of World War II. The
effect of this shifting of potential rivals’ interests on trade is to make it such that a future
decline of the dominant state does not undermine the institutions it created (Keohane 2005).
That is, the would-be rival, while jockeying for primacy, will have incentives to maintain the
systemic rules (and accompany institutions) of the declining power.
The pursuit of liberalization is not globally absolute or temporally linear. Instead, the
liberalization process for the dominant state will require it to spend resources convincing
resistant states to adopt the norms it promotes. Some countries will be more prone to adopt
increasing levels of liberalization while others will have domestic and regional reasons to
resist the evolving norm. As the dominant state uses a variety of instruments to compel
states to liberalize, we will see a range of early to late adopters. Likewise, the dominant
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state may go through periods where it more or less aggressively pushes its agenda based on
competitive demands for its resources.
Great Britain during the 19th century becomes the globally dominant state after the
end of the Napoleonic Wars; however, it is slow to pursue liberalization and makes its
greatest leap when it repeals the Corn Laws in 1846. It pushes for liberalization and global
adoption of the gold standard as part of its foreign policy, but not all states follow (Gallagher
and Robinson 1953; Scherrer 1995). The United States, the state later to assume Great
Britain’s global mantle, does not formally adopt the gold standard until 1903 and does not
adopt unconditional Most Favored Nation Status as a trade instrument until 1922, well after
the decline of 19th century’s unipolar system. The United States’ increasing status as a
global exporter encourages a domestic political realignment around trade that allows the
passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 (Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast
1997; Hiscox 1999). The post-World War II configuration allows the US to have a central
hand in creating the institutions of the contemporary global financial and economic system
including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While this sets the stage for the promotion of liberalization
during the Cold War, the US pursues a variety of agreements globally through various rounds
of GATT/World Trade Organization meetings and regionally through agreements such as
the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Central American Free Trade Agreement,
and working with regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
The relationship between more hierarchical structures and liberalization is not automatic,
but an evolving process.
The literature on the relationship between power, hierarchy, and liberalization, abated
to a significant degree after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the shift to multipolarity that
seemed apparent in the 1970s and 1980s became an unlikely prospect in the near future.
Scholars saw the bipolar system of the Cold War transitioning to multipolarity as emerging
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economic powers (Japan and Germany), rising regional economic blocs (Europe and OPEC),
and new centers of power (China and India) threatened to become great powers (Keohane
2005). The dissolution of the Soviet Union catapulted the United States to unrivaled unipo-
larity and the emerging threats from the previous decades were unable to catchup. However,
the research, as well as debate, still offers active scholarship. Most prominently, Lake’s
(2009) recent research on hierarchy looks at the provision of security as a series of contrac-
tual bargains between the United States and other actors. Other states trade away portions
of their sovereignty in exchange for security guarantees and military resources. This series
of contractual relationships is the cornerstone in which the US maintains hierarchy.
3 Regions of Prosperity
A globally dominant state seeks to integrate economies by inducing trade liberalization as
long as the costs of providing incentives are less than the expected benefits derived from
that system. Despite a desire to pressure all states to globalize, a world power cannot solely
enforce global norms as its own power is inevitably limited and costs of enforcing regimes
become exponentially large (increasing by the number of potentially defecting states and
monitoring any pair of states). Like any other actor, it faces opportunity costs in pursuing
effective liberalization. If the global power attempted to curtail all defection from interna-
tional regimes, it would invariably overstretch itself—in terms of capabilities of providing
rewards and punishments in using military, economic, and diplomatic tools—and create the
conditions that encourage retrenchment instead of liberalization (Alt, Calvert and Humes
1988).
A dominant state, seeking opportunities that allow it to achieve its objective of increased
liberalization, will look for regional configurations that are the least costly in achieving its
preferences. Within any given region, we see a replication of global polarity configurations as
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issues of power parity define regions where two or more actors have similar power statures,
or disparity where no other state rivals a prominent single state in power. In a region of
asymmetric power distribution, there is only one actor that can act as a possible agent to
promote liberalization. This constrains liberalization promotion as an unchecked regional
power does not have other regional threats to prevent it from renegotiating the regional
status quo. Consequently, even if a regional power has similar preferences for liberalization
as a global power, it still affords it more opportunities to defect on maintaining such regimes
(Alt, Calvert and Humes 1988). To invoke the principal–agent dilemma that mirrors the
liberalization dilemma, the actors employed by a principal are not always faithful to the
principal and the risk of agency loss remains (Ross 1973).
A regional power has a continuum of trade policies it can pursue from autarky to complete
liberalization and its position affords it the ability to promote a similar policy regionally. A
rational power may find it beneficial to pursue either an optimal tariff policy or a regional
trade bloc. The former policy would seek to enrich itself (protecting its industries while
encouraging other regional actors to open their markets) (Brander and Spencer 1992; Gowa
1989); the latter policy results in trade diversion where regional states replace their global
trading partners with regional ones (Bhagwati and Panagariya 1999; Freinkman, Polyakov
and Revenco 2004). Both arrangements, from a global perspective, lead to suboptimal trad-
ing patterns and lower levels of trade, but are uniquely advantageous relative to a globally
liberalized marketplace. Regional powers can protect their markets or regions from compe-
tition while taking advantage of other states’ liberalized markets.
Using metrics I describe in the research design section, an example of such a configuration
are the Caucasus countries of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Each country has a relative
region dominated by Russia in the post-Cold War period from 1991 through 2007. In 1994,
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreed to create a free trade area, but
failed to ratify a treaty to actually do so. Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, Russia
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pushed for regional trade deals while attempting to dissuade the three states from accepting
stronger institutional agreements with the West, particularly the European Union and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nygren 2007). Consequently, while lowering trade
barriers would increase trade activity among members party to a preferential trade region,
the creation of a limited regional trade agreement would result in trade diversion. As the
countries pursued various policies both in favor of Russia and the West, Russia attempted
to limit the Caucasus’ movement to the West both politically and economically (Babayan
2015). For example, Russian-Georgian diplomatic relations break down, Russia imposes
energy, trade, and migrant sanctions on Georgia, and goes to war with Georgia in 2008
(Newnham 2015). Georgia withdraws from the CIS entirely. Armenia initially seeks economic
cooperation with the EU, but rejects an Association Agreement in 2013 and instead joins
the Russian supportive alternatives of the CIS Free Trade Area in 2011 and the Eurasian
Customs Union in 2014.
Alternative to an asymmetric region, a regional power is less capable of achieving an
optimal tariff or a regional trade bloc if they have a competing power capable of demanding
reciprocal reductions in trade barriers. The regional rival, by invoking global norms and
acting on behalf of the globally dominant power, can both constrain the anti-liberalizing
power, encourage the anti-liberalizing power to become enmeshed in the liberalizing status-
quo, and advantage itself by aligning with the global power. In regions with competing
powers, both states may find it advantageous to be on the side of the global power than
developing both a regional and global antagonist. By having two or more potent rivals in
a region, such power parity, regardless of whether the states are friends or foes, act as a
check on the behaviors of states attempting to renegotiate the status quo. A regional peer
becomes a monitoring mechanism as the monitoring state has an incentive to encourage
norm compliance.
The globally dominant state prefers to deputize agents instead of being the sole, global
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sheriff as norm enforcement and maintenance are increasingly costly; if a global power can
defer costs to agents that are willing to bear the burden of monitoring and enforcement, then
the global power will prefer to put liberalization pressure on regions that offer the best cost-
benefit calculation. In addition to coercion towards a recalcitrant minor power, the global
power can credibly commit to working and rewarding the monitoring state over the defecting
state, shifting the balance of power within a region. Alternatively to the asymmetric region,
regions at parity have at least two states that engage in rule-making and norm-setting within
their region and liberalizing states can hold their markets hostage if a rival state is resistant;
regional powers can demand reciprocation for access to their own markets. This demand,
and the norm of trade reciprocity, facilitates further liberalization.
The competition between power-equivalent states combined with the tools of an effective
regime, which a globally-dominant power underwrites, create the conditions to make these
regions more prone to liberalization than regions without power parity. With each regional
power keeping each other in check under global regimes, this creates a ripple effect throughout
the region in two ways. First, it establishes the norm of trading practices within the region
between the regional powers and lesser powers within the region. Rivalrous powers will
seek reciprocal reductions in trade barriers with smaller countries in the region to maintain
their relative power (otherwise the trading relationship would be asymmetric). Additionally,
given the implications of gravity models of trade and the known correlation between economy
size and power, the regional powers are the regional trading centers for any given area and
increased liberalization of their economies will allow actors more opportunities to import
and export with these powers.
Post-War Europe exhibits this behavior quite well as, while the US began to push for
greater institutional mechanisms for liberalization globally, the balance of power between
European rivals increased. France, in particular, exemplifies this pattern where this study’s
measure of bilateral dominance and regional dominance for France changes dramatically
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between 1929 and 1945. France’s region became dominated in 1939, but drops dramatically
as Europe shifts to the post-war era. As regional parity drops below a standard deviation
of the global mean, we see France become one of the six founders of the European Coal
and Steel Community, help establish the European Common Market, and help create the
groundwork for the European Union. This is in concert with former rival Germany as both
countries seek to bind each other both within the region and to the increasing liberalized
global economic order (Dinan 2004; Gillingham 2004).
In sum, in regional disparity, a state that challenges the status quo may or may not catch
the attention of a global power. However, in regional parity, there are more checks upon
actors that attempt to undermine international regimes. These checks increase the likelihood
for defection to be detected and facilitates norm compliance with liberalization. The role of
regional configurations affords the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Countries in a region with a dominant regional power will trade less than
countries in regions that have two or more powers at parity.
We should expect both regional and global pressures for trade liberalization in regions
of power parity. States, unable to cheaply defect on liberalization norms, will either reduce
existing barriers or, at a minimum, not erect additional barriers to trade. Reductions in
barriers and maintenance of existing trade liberalization policies make the opportunities for
trade more lucrative and we should see a corresponding behavioral response to a reduction
in those barriers: non-state actors will engage in more trade.
[Figure 1 here]
Given the differing predictions, figure 1 provides a break down as to the relationship
between global power configurations and regional power configurations. The primary argu-
ment advanced in this paper focuses on the left hand side of the table where scholars posit
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that trade promotion ought to happen. When there is regional dominance, we expect the
promotion of trade to be countered by regional recalcitrance; when there is parity, states will
use the norms of liberalization to prevent their rivals from free-riding and benefiting them-
selves regionally. Under conditions of global bi- or multi-polarity, the regional configuration
matters less as liberalization promotion is not the norm. Regionally dominant states may
still attempt to form regional trade blocs or grow their power through protectionism while
regional states at parity have no norm to use against each other. It is still possible for a
small number of states to seek liberalization as a way to encourage mutually beneficial trade
(Krasner 1976), but that cooperation is less likely without the global power’s shadow over
the region.
3.1 Defining Regions
Trying to conceptualize what to include within and without a region is a difficult enterprise.
Classic attempts, such as those that employ the Correlates of War database, may define
regions purely as a state’s location with a defined geographic area such as Europe, Africa,
and Asia. The problems of this approach are twofold. First, it often removes cross-cutting
influences from just outside of the region that have meaningful implications for a country’s
decision-making. Enough countries live on the borders of these regions and to exclusively
define countries like Turkey, Egypt, Russia, or Morocco as existing in a single region would
miss important influences on their behavior. Second, classical regions are limited in concep-
tualizing influence as they often include countries that are unlikely to interact in a way to
consider each other’s power. Mongolia is in the same region as Indonesia, but their influence
on each other is historically minimal.
Scholars have attempted to address these pitfalls in various ways. Russett (1967) uses
different techniques to create regions based on social and cultural homogeneity, political
attitudes, political interdependence, and economic interdependence, establishing different
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behavioral definitions of regions. Lemke (2002), in examining how power transition theory
may work at the regional level, use power degradation and distance to figure out which
countries can meaningfully deploy troops in each others’ territory. This study examines
regions as neighborhoods. For each state, I consider its region to include all surrounding
states the referent state shares a border with. While this is a restrictive assumption, it does
satisfy the condition of being politically relevant as neighbors are the most likely to go to
war (Bremer 1992). Consequently, this construction of regions facilitates studying if a state’s
immediate neighborhood power-configuration influences a state’s economic behavior.
4 Research Design
Constructing an appropriate test of how trade fluctuates based on exogenous factors is not
always a straightforward task as there are numerous ways in which scholars conceptualize
models of trade. To conduct a broad series of tests, I use three different units of analysis
to examine how regional disparity affects trade. For the first series of estimations, I use
directed-dyad-years. This data structure facilitates examining how states restrict or loosen
their import barriers within any pair of state.1 Starting with imports is appropriate as
states are generally willing to export to other countries and, while they are more likely to
guard their domestic industries; trade protectionism typically focuses on protecting import-
sensitive industries.
The second unit of analysis is the undirected-dyad-year where every pair of states in a
given year is an observation. This data frame enables me to evaluate whether regional parity
affects the total trade between two pairs of states. Traditionally, theories of power structure
and trade focus on imports as the state promoting liberalization does so by encouraging
states to reduce their trade barriers (i.e. tariffs and quotas); however, the effects of power
1Technically, since it is directional dyads, a test of imports is also a test of exports since all flows from
country i to country j are the inverse of flows from country j to country i.
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at the
Journal of Conflict Resolution, published by SAGE. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1177/0022002716669809
concentration should put pressure to reduce trade barriers in both countries, resulting in
changes in both imports and exports. Consequently, if both countries are reducing trade
barriers, trade should increase in regions of parity. Given that the undirected nature of
the dyads, any country-specific variable from directed-dyads will require generalization to
typify the dyad as a whole. For all such cases, I take the maximum value of a variable to
examine the effect of strong disparity or regional dominance. Since our expectation is that
the larger powers and economies make trade more likely between states, then it will be the
larger economy that drives the relationship within the dyad. In keeping in line with the
gravity model of trade, I sum the populations for both states; this aggregates the size of the
collective market of the two states.
The third set of estimations use the country-year level of analysis. Divorcing the data
from dyads allows a third test as to whether regional power structures systematically in-
fluence a country to trade less with all countries. The monadic version of the data can
eliminate some level of pair-wise bias that may occur due to non-modeled variables that
systematically increase or decrease bilateral trade. This set of data represents the broadest
test of the theory as it eliminates controls available in dyadic estimates.
In all estimations, I employ linear regression to estimate either the natural log of imports
or total trade. For the directed- and undirected-dyadic models, I use a lagged dependent
variable to estimate trade in the observed year. All models employ clustered standard errors
using the appropriate unit of analysis, use dyadic or monadic fixed effects, and use a series
of 4-knot, restricted cubic splines to account for temporal trends.
4.1 Dependent Variables
To test the theory, I employ the Correlates of War (COW) data on international trade
(version 3.0) (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009). These data afford an unparalleled look at
cross-temporal trends as it contains data on bilateral trade flows from 1870–2009. This longer
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look at historical trading is atypical in the trade literature due to the missingness of much
cross-spatial economic data prior to World War II. However, given the temporal range of the
data, I must make some compromises in estimating this series of trade data. Notably, states
did not calculate their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) prior to World War II and GDP is
a fundamental component to estimating trade (Isard 1954). Thus, I use GDP substitutes
when employing the COW trade data.2 Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins (2009) measure the
trade data in current millions of US dollars. Since the data extends back to 1870, using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) deflator is difficult as the US Bureau of Labor Statistics only
covers the 20th century (Sahr 2004). As such, I employ Sahr’s (2003) estimated CPI value
for the full range fo the data. After adjusting for CPI, I added one to all true-zero values
and logged the final value.3
4.2 Regional Power
To include the role of regional power in predicting trade, I construct two different variables
to account for regional power considerations as isolated processes from global power con-
figurations. To accomplish this, I start by using the COW Direct Contiguity data (version
3.1); I determine any given state’s region by using the most relaxed assumption of contiguity
(two states share a border or are within 400 miles of each other over water) to develop the
observed states set of neighbors.4 These shifting regions represent different geographic areas
2As a robustness check, I estimated the models using Gleditsch’s (2002) GDP and trade data set that
covers 1950–2000. This more restrictive data is complete for the time period as Gleditsch imputes any
gaps in the data. When estimating these models using the log of trade, I substituted the log of GDP for
the CINC score for each country. In both sets of models, there remained a negative relationship between
disparity/regional dominance and trade activity. Additionally, I used the same variables in Rose (2004) and
found similar results. These models are available in the appendix.
3Adding a one to the value converts the final value to zero; the natural log of a zero value is undefined
and analysis would treat such cases as missing.
4I exclude states without a neighborhood from consideration in the analysis. Constructing an artificial
measure of power parity to include such neighborless states would require further assumptions about parity
that may not be tenable.
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of concern for any given state and allow for a regional power to remain uncontested in some
regions while contested in others.
For each state’s region, I create two measures. To assess power, I employ the COW
data on National Material Capabilities (version 4.0) that indexes six component measures of
total population, urban population, electricity consumption, steel/iron production, military
spending, and military personnel (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972; Sarkees and Wayman
2010). The total of these six metrics form the Composite Index of National Capability
(CINC) which represents a state’s share of the world’s total of those six indicators. The
CINC score is a common proxy measurement for a state’s relative power in the international
system. The first measure of regional dominance takes the most dominant power (k) in the
neighborhood of the observed state and creates a measure of its power relative to the total
share of power of the observed state’s region ( Powerk
PowerRegion
). The value for regional dominance
ranges from 0 to 1 where lower values suggest relative parity within a region and higher
values of the proportion represents a state that possess a larger share of all of the power
within a region.
Disparity examines the ratio of the most powerful state (k) in the region as compared to
the sum of its power and the second most powerful state (m) in the region ( Powerk
Powerk+Powerm
).
The previous metric may be a function of the number of states within a region and suggest
there is parity in a region when there may be one dominant state, but smaller ones that,
in sum, rival the regional power’s power. This metric examines whether the most powerful
state has at least one other regional state that is at or near parity. Since I calculated
each measure on the observed state, it informs the model whether the state has at least
two credible states that can exert influence over the observed state. To make the variables
comparable, I transform the disparity variable to take on values that ranges from 0 to 1.5
5The natural value of disparity ranges from .5 (complete parity) to 1 (complete disparity). The conversion
calculation is Disparitynew = 2 ∗Disparityold − 1.
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Both measures capture different types of parity and act as tests of the hypothesis.
4.3 Control Variables
I include the gravity model of trade as a standard prediction of bilateral trade between two
countries (Anderson 1979; Isard 1954; Bergstrand 1985). Generally, trade between two states
is a function of population multiplied by GDP divided by distance. Large populations and
economies will trade more than smaller ones while the distance between two states raises
the costs of trade. However, gravity models do vary over whether population should have
a positive effect; some models suggest it is a representation of market size while others
argue that it represents a higher likelihood of trading less due to self-sufficiency (Mart´ınez-
Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann 2003; Carrere 2006). Taking the log of both sides of the
equation, we expect that the natural log of trade positively correlates with ln(GDP) while
negatively correlating with ln(Distance); though, given previous research, I have ambiguous
expectations about the role of population. I use Gleditsch and Ward’s (2008) on capitol-to-
capitol distance; however, due to the presence of dyadic fixed effects, the distance variables
consistently drop out of the estimations as it perfectly correlates with the fixed effects.
As mentioned in the dependent variables, the temporal range of GDP covers the post-
Cold War era. As a proxy for GDP when using the COW trade data, I employ the CINC
score of both countries. While this is not a perfect measure of GDP or economic activity,
the CINC scores strongly, positively correlate with GDP and scholars have traditionally used
both metrics to measure state power and capacity (Kim 2010; Allen and DiGiuseppe 2013).
Like with GDP, CINC-scores should positively correlate with trade.
Given that the regional power hypothesis suggestions mediation for the polarity of the
global system, it reasonable to include measures to account for that. This is problematic
as many theories of power concentration do not speak directly to minor shifts in the power
distribution of the system, but treat global dominance as a binary variable: either the globe
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experiences unipolarity or it is not . For the 1870-2001 time period, most measures would be
uniform and either include everything but 1914–1945 as unipolar or only include pre-1914.6
In both of these cases, these time periods account for less than 2% of the data each and do
not offer substantial temporal variation. I include two different continuous variables that
ascertain different components of global power. First, as is common with previous studies
looking at trade patterns (Mansfield 1993), I measure the concentration (CON ) of power
among the major powers in a given year. I calculate system concentration as follows:
CON =
√∑
P 2i − 1n
1− 1
n
Where P is the CINC scores of the major powers in a given year and n is the number of
major powers for that year (Singer and Small 1972; Ray and Singer 1973). Higher concen-
tration values indicate that a smaller proportion of major powers hold a larger percentage
of relative power for the observed year while lower values indicate a more uniform distri-
bution of power among major powers. This variable measures the change of power at the
system-defining level of majors powers, but given that I expect the effect of regional power
configurations to heighten and dampen global trends, it is natural to assume there is inter-
action between the systemic and regional processes. To attempt to account of this, I allow
for an interaction between concentration and regional power metrics. As I discuss above, the
majority of the cases occur in a period of active liberalization and, given the temporal range
of the data, the interaction is inherent to the model. However, I also offer a final check of
this concept using the different subsamples of hierarchy to assess the performance of regional
variables in context of global periods.
In addition to concentration, I include the CINC score for the United States (CINCUS)
6While the Cold War period is clearly bipolar, hierarchy scholars see the post-World War II period as
hegemonic expansion with the establishment of trade institutions and the promotion of liberalization. There
is some debate over whether the US is in hegemonic decline in the 1970s and Mansfield (1993) visits these
debates by creating binary variables for hegemonic periods.
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as a means to measure the fluctuation in the United States’ relative power with the rest of
the world. Since the US CINC score is a component of the concentration value, this variable
will act as a secondary, modifying variable to the overall effect of global concentration.
A final control is international conflict as derived from the COW interstate war data
(Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The state of the discipline suggests that there is a recursive
relationship between trade and conflict as they are mutually causal; theoretical arguments
suggest that both trade should effect conflict (Russett and Oneal 2001) and that conflict
should cause disruptions in trade (Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 2004). Given the evidence
that conflict does decrease activity, I expect that a state at war is less likely to trade.
Consequently I include a binary variable for whether either state in the dyad is at War or,
in the monadic data, if the observed state at war during that year; in the dyadic data, either
country experiencing a war will be less capable to trade with its partner even if that partner
is not at war.
5 Results
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 offers the initial results with directed-dyad years as the unit of analysis.7 Since
the nature of the trade regime and theories of economic hierarchy concern how actors can
encourage other states to reduce trade-barriers, examining the role of imports provides infor-
mation as to whether we see a behavioral adjustment to a change in policy. Given that the
unit of analysis contains directed-dyads, having information about both actors in the dyad
is important. Consequently, country-specific variables contain one value for each member of
the dyad.
7I have suppressed the results of the splines.
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The first model presents the basic estimation without the independent variables of in-
terest. Across the majority of coefficients, these variables have the expected relationship
with imports. CINC scores positively correlate with trade for both states; previous imports
positively predict imports in the observed period. The log of population is negative which
is in line with previous gravity models that account for GDP as it proxies the resistance
larger countries have to trade (absorption effect). The concentration of the power in the
system and war both negatively correlate with trade in each dyad. The only control variable
that is inconsistent with prior expectations is the United States CINC score. As mentioned
in the research design, this value is a pseudo-interaction term as the CON value contains
information about the United States’ score for the majority of the study’s time period and
acts as a conditional effect upon the magnitude of the CON value. Additionally, the variable
may be capturing intra-period trends. 98% of the sample in Table 1 is from periods of global
liberalization (typically, a binary variable in past studies), and the continuous measure of
the United States’ CINC score may be capturing other processes.
The two independent variables of interest produce results consistent with the hypothesis.
The disparity variables (model 2) measuring the difference between the two most powerful
states within a region is negative for both countries suggesting that, as disparity increases, the
trade flows in the relationship decrease. This implicitly means that higher levels of regional
power dominance has a negative effect on exports; if the premise of the paper is correct, the
higher level of regional asymmetry for stateB produces a region of permissive protectionism.
This leads to a more limited trading space both with the observed state’s neighbors and its
other potential trading partners—that is, the norm of liberalization reciprocity would freeze
a protectionist state’s ability to trade in general and regional trade agreements are even less
likely. The regional dominance variables in model 4 also produce results consistent with the
hypothesis: As a state becomes more dominant in a region relative to all other states in that
region, the amount of trade activity by other states in that region decreases.
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For model 4, the mean for the lagged dependent variable is 1.23 and a 1% change in the
lagged dependent variable accounts for a 0.77% change in the estimated dependent variable
in table 1. Consequently, the remaining variables are functionally capturing how they may
affect the year-to-year changes in imports while also taking into account the dyadic fixed
effects. Overall, this is a small amount of variance not captured by the fixed effects or the
lagged trade value. In the case of disparity, a change from a competitive region to a dominant
region would account for a 10.52% decrease in the dependent variable. While significant,
this is potentially underwhelming when compared to the other variables that predict trade
activity. This diminished result is likely a function of the larger sample accounting for 130
years of data with variable global trading patterns. Additionally, given the directed-dyadic
nature, a stronger effect may be present, but limited as the coefficient accounts for the
mean change in the dependent variable over nearly a million different observations. Thus,
capturing a 10% change in trade is substantial. Given the initial results of both regional
dominance and disparity, the results are promising.
[Figure 2 here]
Models 3 and 5 introduce the interaction terms for their counter-parts in models 2 and
4. The interaction terms determine if the regional power concentration variables are acting
in concert with the systemic changes happening with major powers. Brambor, Clark and
Golder (2006) illustrate that interpreting the significance of an interaction directly from the
regression standard error is misleading and, to understand the significance of the interac-
tion, requires combining the coefficients and the standard errors of both the interactive and
constituent terms. Figure 2 graphs the results for both models 3 and 5. Model 3, charts a
and b, show the marginal effects of disparity and concentration on the dependent variable.
For part a, the variable is statistically different from zero throughout the model, suggesting
a negative result from the interaction, but the effect does not vary across the range of con-
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centration. The marginal effect of concentration tells a similar story in figure 2b where the
interaction is significant, but does not show variation across its range. Consequently, there
is not a meaningful interaction between these variables.
Model 5 tells a more stark story in regards to the joint relationship between regional
dominance and concentration. The marginal effect of regional dominance does not signifi-
cantly vary across the range of concentration in figure 2c. In figure 2d, the marginal effect
of concentration is indistinguishable from zero up until 28.90%. After that, it is negative
and significant. Consequently, for areas that are asymmetric, concentration appears to have
increasingly suppressive effects on trade giving some support to our expectations on the role
of regional dominance relative to global power concentration.
[Table 2 here]
The estimations of table 2 ask a different question than the previous two tables as it uses
undirected dyads. Given this formulation, instead of asking how regional power asymmetry
affects imports, we evaluate how regional disparity and dominance impact total trade. Given
that country-specific variables not meaningful in undirected analysis, I use the maximum
value of each of the country-specific variables as a gravity effect on the dyad. Therefore, the
variables here look at the pair of countries from the perspective of the country that is the
strongest (CINC ), the sum of the state’s population (ln(pop)), and has the most dominant
region. Thus, lower values on dominance means that both states are at a particular value
for dominance or lower. As with table 1, our control variables are consistent in the model 1.
[Figure 3 here]
The regional power concentration variable in the second estimation provides a negative
relationship between disparity and trade. If either state within a dyad belongs to a region of
increasing dominance, it will exhibit a depressant effect upon the trade in that relationship.
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Model 4 suggests that regional dominance has a similar effect within the dyad. Figure 3
provides the marginal effects of each variable of interest. In figure 3a and 3c, the effects
of disparity and regional dominance do not vary for different levels of concentration, but
is static; 2b also exhibits this behavior for the marginal effect of concentration relative to
disparity. Figures 3a and 2b imply that there is not a meaningful interaction between con-
centration and disparity in model 3. Strikingly, figure 3d demonstrates concentration having
increasingly negative marginal effects on trade. Unlike figure 2d, we also see concentration
positively affecting trade in regions of parity. Thus, we are most likely to see concentration
positively affecting trade in regions with two or more competing states, but the opposite
effect for areas that contain a single regional power. This may explain the divergence in
findings for the relationship between concentration and liberalization.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 presents the third unit of analysis: the country year. By eliminating the bilateral
trading partners for each country, these estimations examine how being in a region of dis-
parity affects a country’s aggregate trade levels. For the full sample, the disparity measure
offers a 22.55% reduction in trade while regional dominance predicts a 50.69% decline. While
there is a more than 100% increase in the magnitudes of the variables than in the previous
models; this is not surprising for two distinct reasons. First, the sample space is smaller than
the directed dyadic sample by an order of magnitude and the independent variables may be
capturing more information that we are not observing in the monadic unit of analysis. The
monadic unit of analysis collapses the nuances of bilateral interactions into a single aggregate
that ignores the makeup of actual and potential trading partners. Second, more promisingly,
these models capture all trade done by a state within a region and ignores trade partners.
It directly asks whether a state within a region of disparity has suppressed trade activity
compared to a state within regional parity. Overwhelmingly, states in asymmetric regions
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face a 20%-50% decline in trade when compared to similar states in regions of parity.
[Figure 4 here]
Figure 4 compares four different models in showing the effect of disparity and regional
dominance on trade activity. In all four figures, I hold all the variables, except the indepen-
dent variables of interest, at their respective means or modes. Figure 4a employs model 2 in
table 1 and shows the reduction in imports across the range of the disparity variable. Figures
4b and 4c employ regional dominance without and with the interaction term respectively.
Instead of examining imports as the dependent variable, it examines total trade within an
undirected dyad. As such, the total trade variable is larger than in figure 3a and the magni-
tude of the decline is also larger. Generally, when controlling for the interactive possibility
between models 4 and 5 in table 2, the result on trade is roughly the same. Figure 4d shows
a different effect than the previous three figures as it examines the monadic relationship
between regional dominance and trade. The dependent variable mean and median are much
larger, and as noted in the estimates for table 3, the decline is more substantial than the
previous figures.
5.1 Does Global Hierarchy Matter?
The previous results provide evidence for the relationship between various regions and the
concentration of the international system; however, most of the earlier theories of hierarchy
and hegemony see the international system as a binary event where either global hierarchy
exists or it does not. Using the classification of hegemony by Gilpin (1983) as tested by
Mansfield (1993), I break the sample into three periods: British hegemony from 1871-1914,
inter-war non-hegemony from 1915-1944, and post-War US hegemony of 1945-2007. For each
period, I use model 2 and 4 from Table 1 to examine the relative effect of regions in each time
period and I exclude the appropriate hegemonic state in the pre-War and post-War periods.
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Additionally, I exclude the interactive term as, if the previous scholarship is correct about
international dominance being a binary condition, then the regional variables are inherently
interactive.8
[Table 4 here]
First, as noted previously, the sample sizes are drastically asymmetric. Notably, the first
two periods account for just over 3% of the data, meaning that most of the data exist in the
post-War time period. This is a result of a data collection bias that favors the present as well
as fewer possible dyads in these time periods. The 1871-1914 time period exhibits coefficients
in the expected direction for model 1 and 2, but fail to achieve statistic significance. This
likely results from one of two considerations: First, this could be from taking a thin slice
of the sample to estimate or, second, this period is marked as a period of British decline
and countervailing states/rises could lead to higher variance in the results. The second time
period provides inconsistent results where state A, in an asymmetric region, imports less,
but if its trading partner is in an asymmetric region, it imports more while state B exports
more. The effect, in both model three and four, is strongest for the importing state; if two
states have identical regions, they will trade less on average. This inconsistency, regions
having mixed results, follows from the lack of international hierarchy in the time period;
without the global push for liberalization, regional powers can still isolate their region when
unchallenged. Finally, the post-War period (models 5 and 6) behaves as expected where
asymmetric regions suppress trade while symmetric regions enable it. While the results are
not uniform, they do provide support for the hypothesis (asymmetric regions trade less)
while also providing additional support to the interactive relationship between global powers
and regional powers.
8This would be a reason to exclude the measures of international concentration as well as the US CINC
score. I include the variables for compatibility with the initial models; however, excluding these variables
does not significantly alter the results. I include these models in the supplemental models of the appendix.
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Discussion and Further Work
The results from this research portray a consistent picture: regions of parity are more con-
ducive to trade activity than regions of disparity. I offer two calculations of dominance
here: disparity between the two strongest countries and regional dominance. Across most
specifications, it is clear that disparity is a more consistent predictor of how regional power
structures and hierarchy affect trade. In terms of systemic and major power theories about
power and liberalization, this research indicates that such processes are not uniform. If we
expect liberalization to increase and decrease with the rise and decline of a single world
power, this research indicates that such parabolic rise and declines will be globally bumpy
based on local power distributions.
One area that this research speaks to is the methodological use of regions. A significant
finding of this study suggests that there is an interactive relationship between regions and
the global political climate; fundamentally, the regional behavior and existence of states is
not isolated from global trends and global trends interact differently with each regions. A
natural step from this project is to continue to investigate the various conceptualizations of
regions (e.g. Russett (1967) and Lemke (2002)) and how they interact with global pressures.
Consequently, this also means that regions are not reliable microcosms for global theories of
international relations. In the case of hierarchy, dominant regional powers do not replicate
the behavior of global powers and pursue aggressive liberalization; instead, they react to
such forces and attempt to free ride when they are capable of doing so. This stark difference
suggests that some major power theories need additional context when applied to minor
powers.
This research provides three different avenues to further explore these questions. First,
hierarchy in the global system is not uniform in either spatial nor temporal terms. Even
when there is one dominant state, let alone when there is a bipolar system, the extent of
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that state’s reach is going to be dependent upon its relationship with states in every region.
According to Lake (2009), the US manages its hierarchical relationships with contractual
bargaining and the extent of its influence is dependent upon these contracts. Regions in
which the United States is well-entrenched are going to have more pressure for economic and
security processes than areas where the United States is less well entrenched. Temporally
speaking, periods of hegemony are not uniform either as hegemonic periods include phases
where dominant states may be ascending, stable, or declining–examining the relative degree
of global hierarchy and emerging alternatives can bring nuance the results in this paper.
Some arguments in the extant literature suggest effective dominant states can and will use
their position to realign rivals’ preferences through global norms and encouraging global
liberalization (Tammen and Kugler 2006). The relationship between dominant powers and
emerging powers is unlikely to uniformly affect regions as such transitions themselves are
not linear nor uniform processes. Evaluating the conditioning effect of transition periods on
regional configurations could prove to be a fruitful area of research as well as answer evolving
questions about the trajectory of China relative to the United States.
Two additional research suggestions from the assumptions and empirical evidence include
bringing in preferences and accounting for flexible hierarchy. The theoretical section of this
paper assumes preferences to derive from regional power distributions. While this is not
an unreasonable assumption to make in international relations scholarship, it is one that is
testable. Typically, preferences are difficult to measure and, even when countries convey them
publicly, it is unclear whether stated intentions are genuine or strategic misrepresentation.
Recent scholarship has dug deeper into some metrics of preference revelation, such as state
voting in the United Nations, to sort countries along ideological axes (Voeten 2013), or using
alliance portfolios to judge foreign policy similarity (Signorino and Ritter 1999). Attempting
to find the spatial-ideological difference between the United States and regional powers may
reveal bumps in the bumps of liberalization—states aligned more with the United States may
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have less of a suppressing effect upon trade than states that do not align with the United
States.
In both cases, there is a serious case of endogeneity: preferences and relationship with
the United States is likely dependent, at least partially, upon the state’s relations with other
states in the region. Thus, disentangling the incentives derived from power versus those that
come from other exogenous sources requires careful consideration.
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Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Concentration and Power across Table 1
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Figure 1: Theoretical expectations about the interplay between global configurations and
regional configurations and their relation to liberalization promotion.
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Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Concentration and Power across Table 2
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Figure 4: Predicted Level of Trade across Multiple Models
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Table 1: Predicting Imports using Correlates of War Trade Data for Directed Dyads, 1871–
2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Imports AB Imports AB Imports AB Imports AB Imports AB
DisparityA -0.0638
∗∗∗ -0.0716∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0280)
DisparityB -0.0666
∗∗∗ -0.0666∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0115)
Disparity InteractionA 0.0247
(0.0829)
Regional DominanceA -0.1030
∗∗∗ 0.0329
(0.0152) (0.0332)
Regional DominanceB -0.1079
∗∗∗ -0.1080∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0152)
Dominance InteractionA -0.4267
∗∗∗
(0.0930)
Concentration -0.2029∗∗∗ -0.2191∗∗∗ -0.2352∗∗∗ -0.2077∗∗∗ 0.0389
(0.0285) (0.0332) (0.0665) (0.0299) (0.0632)
CINCUS -0.7892
∗∗∗ -0.9431∗∗∗ -0.9427∗∗∗ -0.8292∗∗∗ -0.8248∗∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0364) (0.0365)
CINCA 1.7166
∗∗∗ 1.7739∗∗∗ 1.7722∗∗∗ 1.8047∗∗∗ 1.8225∗∗∗
(0.1806) (0.2015) (0.2022) (0.1848) (0.1855)
CINCB 1.8764
∗∗∗ 1.8903∗∗∗ 1.8904∗∗∗ 1.9620∗∗∗ 1.9592∗∗∗
(0.1884) (0.2161) (0.2161) (0.1928) (0.1928)
ln(pop)A -0.0158
∗∗ -0.0133∗ -0.0133∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0189∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0064)
ln(pop)B -0.0634
∗∗∗ -0.0626∗∗∗ -0.0626∗∗∗ -0.0667∗∗∗ -0.0668∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0067) (0.0067)
War -0.0786∗∗∗ -0.0854∗∗∗ -0.0854∗∗∗ -0.0784∗∗∗ -0.0781∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0031)
ln(Imports) 0.7810∗∗∗ 0.7775∗∗∗ 0.7775∗∗∗ 0.7781∗∗∗ 0.7781∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Constant -17.6640∗∗∗ -17.6173∗∗∗ -17.6155∗∗∗ -17.3307∗∗∗ -17.3869∗∗∗
(0.4318) (0.4763) (0.4767) (0.4403) (0.4422)
R2 0.708 0.701 0.701 0.704 0.704
Observations 1027605 826422 826422 976455 976455
∗ p≤ 0.10; ∗∗ p≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗ p≤0.01
Each model employs clustered standard errors for the directed-dyad.
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Table 2: Predicting Total Trade using Correlates of War Trade Data for Undirected Dyads,
1871–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Trade Total Trade Total Trade Total Trade Total Trade
Disparitymax -0.1529
∗∗∗ -0.1576∗∗
(0.0223) (0.0691)
Disparity Interactionmax 0.0150
(0.2086)
Regional Dominancemax -0.1850
∗∗∗ 0.1478∗∗∗
(0.0232) (0.0556)
Dominance Interactionmax -1.0531
∗∗∗
(0.1616)
Concentration -0.2709∗∗∗ -0.2904∗∗∗ -0.3025∗ -0.2828∗∗∗ 0.4451∗∗∗
(0.0426) (0.0496) (0.1807) (0.0448) (0.1228)
CINCUS -1.1035
∗∗∗ -1.2407∗∗∗ -1.2405∗∗∗ -1.1603∗∗∗ -1.1559∗∗∗
(0.0500) (0.0584) (0.0582) (0.0521) (0.0521)
CINCmax 1.7682
∗∗∗ 1.8156∗∗∗ 1.8153∗∗∗ 1.8646∗∗∗ 1.8861∗∗∗
(0.1941) (0.2166) (0.2171) (0.2002) (0.2010)
ln(Pop)sum -0.0193
∗∗∗ -0.0154∗∗ -0.0154∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0066)
War -0.0929∗∗∗ -0.1011∗∗∗ -0.1011∗∗∗ -0.0937∗∗∗ -0.0931∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0046)
ln(Total trade) 0.7793∗∗∗ 0.7776∗∗∗ 0.7776∗∗∗ 0.7763∗∗∗ 0.7763∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Constant -16.5579∗∗∗ -16.3245∗∗∗ -16.3225∗∗∗ -16.2818∗∗∗ -16.4445∗∗∗
(0.5880) (0.6498) (0.6544) (0.6006) (0.6074)
R2 0.723 0.718 0.718 0.720 0.720
Observations 490646 395665 395665 466019 466019
∗ p≤ 0.10; ∗∗ p≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗ p≤0.01
Each model employs clustered standard errors for the undirected-dyad.
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Table 3: Predicting Monadic Trade Activity, 1871–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imports COW Imports COW Total Trade Total Trade
Disparity -0.2259∗∗ -0.2497∗∗
(0.1123) (0.1192)
Regional Dominance -0.4992∗∗∗ -0.5107∗∗∗
(0.1671) (0.1730)
Concentration 4.1850∗∗∗ 4.2288∗∗∗ 4.5841∗∗∗ 4.6255∗∗∗
(0.3753) (0.3777) (0.4021) (0.4049)
CINCUS -1.4767
∗∗∗ -1.5152∗∗∗ -1.1681∗∗ -1.2015∗∗
(0.5068) (0.5043) (0.5255) (0.5216)
ln(Pop) 0.1720∗∗∗ 0.1467∗∗∗ 0.1784∗∗∗ 0.1522∗∗∗
(0.0454) (0.0477) (0.0459) (0.0489)
War -0.4115∗∗∗ -0.4094∗∗∗ -0.4277∗∗∗ -0.4252∗∗∗
(0.0923) (0.0929) (0.0976) (0.0983)
CINCA 0.1574 0.3373 -0.1459 0.0273
(1.3305) (1.3035) (1.4379) (1.4025)
ln(Imports) 0.7724∗∗∗ 0.7708∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0118)
ln(Total trade) 0.7866∗∗∗ 0.7853∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0112)
Constant 8.7086∗∗ 7.9713∗∗ 13.6235∗∗∗ 12.8714∗∗∗
(4.0371) (3.9480) (3.9186) (3.8314)
R2 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800
Observations 10515 10515 10515 10515
∗ p≤ 0.10; ∗∗ p≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗ p≤0.01
Each model employs clustered standard errors for each country.
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Table 4: Predicting Imports using Correlates of War Trade Data for Dyriected Dyads by
Hegemonic Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-1914 Pre-1914 Inter-war Inter-war Post-WWII Post-WWII
DisparityA -0.1049 -0.2493
∗∗∗ -0.0485∗∗∗
(0.1766) (0.0796) (0.0113)
DisparityB -0.0823 0.1181 -0.0707
∗∗∗
(0.1713) (0.0737) (0.0121)
Regional DominanceA -0.0951 -0.4929
∗∗∗ -0.0413∗∗
(0.3439) (0.1177) (0.0171)
Regional DominanceB -0.0917 0.3953
∗∗∗ -0.0663∗∗∗
(0.3851) (0.1213) (0.0169)
CINCA 5.7406
∗∗∗ 5.8263∗∗∗ 2.0096∗∗∗ 2.1208∗∗∗ 2.8315∗∗∗ 2.9312∗∗∗
(1.3155) (1.3861) (0.6305) (0.6329) (0.3557) (0.3520)
CINCB 2.1974
∗∗∗ 2.1326∗∗∗ 1.3891∗∗∗ 1.2968∗∗∗ 1.9428∗∗∗ 1.9926∗∗∗
(0.7711) (0.7700) (0.4921) (0.4934) (0.2810) (0.2800)
ln(pop)A 0.3479
∗∗ 0.3550∗∗ -0.9720∗∗∗ -1.0402∗∗∗ -0.0222∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗∗
(0.1503) (0.1487) (0.2359) (0.2374) (0.0074) (0.0075)
ln(pop)B 0.4673
∗∗∗ 0.4792∗∗∗ 0.0155 0.0803 -0.0729∗∗∗ -0.0682∗∗∗
(0.1806) (0.1812) (0.1969) (0.2005) (0.0078) (0.0079)
War -0.0557∗∗ -0.0548∗∗ -0.0722∗∗∗ -0.0698∗∗∗ -0.0895∗∗∗ -0.0891∗∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0236) (0.0232) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Concentration 2.9247∗∗∗ 2.9273∗∗∗ -0.8514∗ -0.8536∗ -0.7233∗∗∗ -0.6970∗∗∗
(0.9879) (1.0018) (0.4561) (0.4548) (0.0393) (0.0394)
CINCUS 2.7180
∗∗∗ 2.7183∗∗∗ -0.2665 -0.1918 0.5861∗∗∗ 0.5652∗∗∗
(0.7571) (0.7704) (0.6111) (0.6092) (0.0766) (0.0767)
ln(Imports) 0.3821∗∗∗ 0.3820∗∗∗ 0.4916∗∗∗ 0.4911∗∗∗ 0.7700∗∗∗ 0.7703∗∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Constant -27.8658∗∗∗ -28.1502∗∗∗ -112.6089∗∗∗ -113.0690∗∗∗ -38.0410∗∗∗ -37.1685∗∗∗
(10.1245) (10.0674) (21.6200) (21.4949) (1.2317) (1.2430)
R2 0.344 0.344 0.325 0.326 0.669 0.669
Observations 9545 9545 16545 16545 792162 792162
∗ p≤ 0.10; ∗∗ p≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗ p≤0.01
Each model employs clustered standard errors for the directed-dyad.
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